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Godfrey: Minnesota Court Provides Employers Economic Incentive to Forgo Re

COMMENT
MINNESOTA COURT PROVIDES EMPLOYERS ECONOMIC
INCENTIVE TO FORGO REHIRING TEMPORARILY
PARTIALLY DISABLED EMPLOYEES
[Parson v. Holman Erection Co., 428 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 1988)]

INTRODUCTION

The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workingman. I
This simple but striking slogan encapsulates the theory that was
the driving force behind the creation of a compulsory system of
workers' compensation in Minnesota.2 Workers were seen as unable
to cope alone with the economic hardships wrought by work-related
injuries and disease.3 A new statutory system of compensation was
adopted to require the transfer of these costs to the product created
through the workers' labors4 and to prevent disabled workers from
1. This slogan has been attributed to David Lloyd George, but its authorship
has not been verified. See Riesenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation,
35 MINN. L. REV. 525, 529 (1951); see also J. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF

TORTS 519 (1941).
2. Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 429, 35 N.W.2d 719, 732-33 (1949);
Eichholz v. Shaft, 166 Minn. 339, 342, 208 N.W.18, 19 (1926). The Eichholz court
expressed this theme in a simple and concise manner, stating that the object of the
then Workmen's Compensation Act "was to saddle the industries with the loss that
resulted to the employees therein from accidental injuries received in the work." Id.
at 342, 208 N.W. at 19.
Some twenty-three years later, the Breimhorst court mirrored this interpretation
and added language of its own to conclude, "The increased industrialization of modem society has been accompanied by the increased industrial disability of employees,
a burden which individual employees cannot bear and which constitutes a burden
that can be borne equitably and expeditiously only by placing it upon industry as a
cost of production." 227 Minn. at 429, 35 N.W.2d at 732-33.
3. Another basis for the creation of the workers' compensation system was that
"it [had] become generally recognized that the common law fail[ed] to make adequate or equitable provision for the economic loss resulting from a disability which
deprives the workman of his earning power." Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 126
Minn. 286, 289, 148 N.W. 71, 72 (1914).
Professor Kirwin has noted that workers' compensation systems were also created, in part, to address the fact that the common law "offered little recourse for the
afflicted.... [T]he common-law defenses of contributory negligence and assumption
of risk unquestionably proved to be formidable obstacles to relief." Kirwin, Compensation For Disease Under The Minnesota Workers' Compensation Law, 6 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 619, 622 (1980).
4. 1913 Minn. Laws ch. 467.
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becoming public charges.5
By the mid to late 1970s, however, the compensation scheme came
under increasing criticism as overly generous to employees at the
expense of employers,6 and Minnesota's system was decried as one
of the most expensive in the nation.7 The legislature responded in
1983 by introducing changes in the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act that have been described as "massive."8
As part of the 1983 reformation, the then existing structure for
disability compensation was replaced with an extremely complex system. 9 The new structure was designed to reduce costs, litigation,
and uncertainty in the allocation of responsibilities between employers and employees in returning employees who had suffered workrelated injuries back to the workplace.O One of the areas changed
was
that
involving
temporary
partial
disability
(TPD)
compensation. I1
Before 1983, Minnesota Statutes section 176.101, subd. 2, governing TPD compensation, provided:
5. Tracy v. Streater/Litton Indus., 283 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Minn. 1979)(referring
to the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act's "time-honored purposes of spreading the cost of industrial injuries and preventing disabled employees from becoming
public charges").
6. In 1977, the Minnesota Legislature established the Workers' Compensation
Study Commission "in order to improve the system of providing workers' compensation insurance at fair and reasonable rates to employers within the state." MINNESOTA WORKERS'

COMPENSATION STUDY COMMISSION: A REPORT TO THE MINNESOTA

LEGISLATURE AND GOVERNOR 1 (February 1979)[hereinafter REPORT]. Employers had
become increasingly concerned with the workers' compensation coverage rates which
then approached "three percent of the total state payroll and ... considerably higher
in certain 'risk' industries." Id. See generally Crochiere, The Plight Of The Displaced Employee Improves: An Analysis Of The 1983 Changes To Minnesota's Worker's Compensation
System, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 623 (1986).
7. Professor Larson noted that in 1974, after Minnesota had adopted through
legislation, payment for functional loss due to injury as well as loss of earning capacity, Minnesota's average manual rate was $1.65-giving it a rank of twenty-first
among the states. By 1978, the average manual rate had risen to $2.83-placing
Minnesota fourteenth in rank. Larson, The Wage-Loss Principlein Workers' Compensation,
6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 501, 532 (1980). "Average manual rate" is "the basic [insurance premium charged] to all employers within any given job classification. It
represents the amount of premiums collected for each $100 of payroll for a small
employer with an average record of safety." REPORT, supra note 6, at 141. See also
CITIZENS LEAGUE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMITTEE,
REFORM: GET THE EMPLOYEES BACK ON THE JOB 141 (Dec.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

1982)[hereinafter CITIZENS
LEAGUE REPORT](in a study of 43 states, Minnesota ranked 12th for insurance rates).
8. Altman, Benanav, Keefe & Volz, Minnesota's Workers' Compensation Scheme: The
Effects And Effectiveness of the 1983 Amendments, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 843 (1987).
9. See 1983 Minn. Laws 290, §§ 42-68, codified at MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd.
1-8 (1988).
10. See generally Crochiere, supra note 6.
11. Act of June 7, 1983, ch. 290, sec. 43, 1983 Minn. Laws 1310, 1339.
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In all cases of temporary partial disability the compensation shall
be 66-2/3 percent of the difference between the daily wage of the
worker at the time of injury and the wage he is able to earn in his
partially disabled condition .... If the employer does not furnish
the worker with work which he can do in his temporary partially
disabled condition and he is unable to procure such work with another employer, after reasonably diligent effort, the employee shall
be paid at the full compensation rate for his or her temporary total
2
disability. 1
In 1983, the language contained in the second part of this provision
was deleted.13 However, since the legislature did not expressly address the issue, the question remained of whether TPD compensation at the temporary total disability (TD)
rate would still be
available to unemployed workers whose injuries had reached maximum medical improvementl4 (MMI) and who had been given ninety
days notice thereof, and who, despite diligent efforts, were unable to
obtain employment. In Parson v. Holman Erection Co. ,15 the Minnesota
Supreme Court answered this question in the negative after an examination of what has become known as the "new law."16 The court
added that, under the new law, these benefits were also unavailable
to unemployed workers ninety days after the end of an approved retraining program.' 7 The court based its determination on the underlying intent of the new law to limit the open-endedness of TTD
compensation,18 the new statutory language limiting these benefits,t9 changes in the terminology describing the various benefits,20
2
and the deletion of all provision for TPD at the TD rate. '
12. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 2 (1988). This section further provides that the
"compensation shall be paid during the period of disability, payment to be made at
the intervals when the wage was payable, as nearly as may be, and subject to a maximum compensation equal to the statewide average weekly wage." Id.
13. 1983 Minn. Laws ch. 290, sec. 43.
14. Maximum medical improvement is statutorily defined as "the date after
which no further significant recovery from or significant lasting improvement to a
personal injury can reasonably be anticipated, based upon reasonable medical
probability." MINN. STAT. § 176.011, subd. 25 (1988). Under the 1983 statutory
scheme, it is used as a cutoff point for TTD benefits. That is, TTD benefits are curtailed 90 days after the employee has reached MMI and has been served a medical
report indicating the employee has reached MMI. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3e
(1988).
15. 428 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 1988).
16. Id. at 74.
17. Id. at 76. Employee rehabilitation is discussed at length in Minnesota Statutes section 176.102, subdivisions 1-14. An in-depth examination of the requirements of rehabilitation plan, approvals, and other related categories is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
18. Id. at 76.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 75-76.
21. Id. at 75.
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The Parson court's holding concerning the unavailability of TPD at
the TTD rate is justified in view of the 1983 amendments limiting
TTD compensation and their legislative history. However, the court
went beyond the issues presented before it to conclude, in dicta, that
TPD compensation would no longer be available to temporarily partially disabled workers who are unemployed. 22 This determination is
without direct support under section 176.101, subd. 2, or any other
provision to be found in the new law. It flies in the face of the underlying legislative intent of the 1983 amendments and that of the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act as a whole. In addition, it breaks
with over fifty years of precedent interpreting the remaining, untouched, portion of the TPD provision. Most importantly, in practical terms, it allows employers to reap the benefits of their employees'
labors until these employees become partially disabled, and then absolves the employers from responsibility in helping their employees
to find work and survive economically thereafter. This Comment will
examine the Parson decision and its impact on the availability of TPD
compensation.

I.

HISTORY OF TEMPORARY PARTIAL DISABILITY
BENEFITS BEFORE 1983

TPD benefits have been available since the inception of the Minnesota workers' compensation system in 1913.23 Then, as now, TPD
compensation was to be provided at a certain percentage difference 2 4 between what the partially disabled employee received as
wages at the time of injury, and what the employee was able to earn
in his or her partially disabled condition. 2 5 Like the current provi22. Id. at 76. It is not clear whether the Parson court concluded that TPD compensation was unavailable to all unemployed workers, or only to those unemployed
90 days after reaching MMI days or 90 days after the end of an approved retraining
program. The confusion is due to the fact that the Parson case involved an unemployed worker who had been paid TTD compensation until 90 days post MMI. The
question of any TPD compensation during that period was not raised. Based on Parson and subsequent decisions, the workers' compensation court of appeals in
Einberger v. 3M Co., No. 477-50-5883, slip. op. (Feb. 16, 1988), appears to have
concluded that the rule presently is that "an employee who has been unable to find
employment is not entitled to [TPD] compensation at the [TFD] rate subsequent to
90-days post-MMI." Id. at 4.
23. See 1913 Minn. Laws ch. 467, sec. 13(b).
24. The difference was set at fifty percent in 1913. 1913 Minn. Laws ch. 467 sec.
13(b). This was subsequently raised to sixty percent in 1917. 1917 Minn. Gen. Laws
ch. 351, sec. 13(b). The percentage was placed at its current level of sixty six and
two-thirds percent in 1919. 1919 Minn. Laws ch. 442, sec. 1.
25. The statutory provision then read, "In all cases of temporary partial disability
the compensation shall be fifty per cent of the difference between the wage of the
workman at the time of the injury, and the wage he is able to earn in his partially
disabled condition ..
" 1913 Minn. Laws ch. 467, sec. 13(b).
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sion, wages were to be paid during the time of disability at intervals
approximating when the wage was paid before the injury.26 In 1913,
however, an injured employee could not receive TPD compensation
beyond three hundred weeks.2 7 The maximum weekly amount was
the same as that for TTD compensation.28
With the exception of gradual increases in the payment percentage
between pre-injury wages and post-injury earning ability,29 the content of the statutory provision for TPD compensation remained essentially the same until 1943. In 1943, language was added to the
then existing version of section 176.101, subdivision 2, essentially
splitting the provision into two parts.3 0 The first part still provided
for the payment of a portion of the difference between the wage at
injury and the wage which the employee was able to earn post-injury.31 The second part further provided that
if the employer does not furnish the workman with work which he
can do in his temporary partially disabled condition and, after a
reasonably diligent effort, he is unable to procure such work with
another employer, the commission may fix a rate of compensation
to be paid to the workman during the period of such disability and
unemployment ....

3

2

The addition of this language was an attempt by the Minnesota Legislature to employ the "carrot and stick" method to get both the employer and employee involved in getting the injured employee back
on the job.33
26. Id.
27. Id. In 1977, the limit on TPD compensation was removed altogether. 1977
Minn. Laws ch. 342, sec. 12(2).
28. 1913 Minn. Laws ch. 467, sec. 13(b). The maximum weekly amount a temporary partially disabled employee was entitled to receive in 1913 was $10. Id. at sec.
13(a). By 1921 the maximum was increased to $18 by 1921. 1921 Minn. Laws ch. 94,
sec. 14(b).
29. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
30. See 1943 Minn. Laws ch. 496, sec. 1.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Koenig v. Northern Insulation Co., 358 N.W.2d 644, 647 n.l (1984)(discussing legislative intent of MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 2). After 1943, if the employer did not provide the injured employee with a job that the employee could
physically handle, the employer would not only pay a certain percentage between
what the employee formerly earned and what the employee was able to earn postinjury, but could be forced to pay more; it was up to the commission's discretion.
However, if the employer did offer the employee a job, or helped the employee to
find employment elsewhere, this threat of greater payment was removed. If the job
offered was a lesser paying job, the employer would still have to pay the employee a
certain percentage difference between the employee's pre-injury wages and post-injury earning ability. Conversely, an employee could not sit on his hands and hope to
collect compensation in the event his former employer did not offer him a job he
could physically perform. If the employee did, however, make diligent efforts to locate work he could do elsewhere, albeit at a lower wage, possibly greater compensa-
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In 1974, the second part of section 176.101, subdivision 2, was
further amended to provide that "the employee shall be paid at the
full compensation rate for his or her temporary total disability,"34
rather than receive compensation fixed by the commission. This addition removed the commission's discretion concerning payment
amounts. However, it was designed to bring the actual language of
the amendment into line with the commission's usual practice of
awarding the injured employee TPD compensation at the TTD
rate.35
II.

Parson v. Holman Erection Co.

Though Parson was a case of first impression, the facts involved
were not particularly novel. On September 11, 1981, Eddie T. Parson (Parson) injured his right knee while he was working as an iron
worker on a construction project for L.H. Sowles, Inc. (Sowles).36
Following knee surgery, Parson returned to work for Sowles but
eventually was laid off. Parson subsequently worked for Holman
Erection Company (Holman) until August 20, 1984, when he injured
his left knee while on the job. Following surgery on the left knee,
Parson's physician advised him that he could not return to construction work. Thereafter he diligently sought employment but was unable to obtain any.
Parson reached MMI with respect to his 1984 injury on July 17,
1985. Holman continued to pay him TTD compensation up to the
ninety day limit. Thereafter Holman paid him economic recovery
compensation. Parson then filed a claim petition for continuing
TTD compensation.
A.

The Court's Analysis

The Parson court first applied a strict statutory analysis to conclude
that the 1983 amendments to section 176.101, subdivision 2, removed any provision for the payment of TPD compensation at the
37
TTD rate to unemployed partially disabled workers such as Parson.
The court began its analysis by noting that one of the major motivation than that based on pre-injury wages and post-injury earning ability would be
forthcoming.
34. 1974 Minn. Laws ch. 486, sec. 2.
35. Representative Harry Sieben, author of the House Bill, addressing the Senate Labor & Commerce Committee, stated that the Bill "is more of a clarifying
amendment, [an award by the commission of TPD compensation at the TD rate] is
primarily what happens in most cases anyway." An Act Relating To Workmens'
Compensation, 1974: Hearings on S. 1931 Before the Senate Committee on Labor &
Commerce (March 7, 1974)(audio tapes).
36. Parson v. Holman Erection Co., 428 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Minn. 1988).
37. Id. at 75.
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tions behind the 1983 overhaul was the problem of open-ended
availability of TTD compensation.38 Using this intent as a backdrop,
the court turned its attention to section 176.101, subdivision 1,
which governs TTD compensation, to provide guidance in determining whether TTD compensation paid at the TTD rate would be available to an employee who, despite diligent effort, was unable to find
employment and had reached ninety days after MMI or an approved
retraining program.
The court examined the language that was added in 1983 to section 176.101, subdivision 1. Six words were added. Since 1983, subdivision 1 has provided that TTD compensation shall be paid during
the period of disability "[slubject to subdivisions 3a to 3u."39 The court

attached great importance to these six words, explaining that they
indicated that entitlement to temporary total compensation is no
longer open-ended.40 The court cited both subdivisions 3d and
3e(a) of section 176.101, limiting the availability of FTD compensation,41 as support for this position.42
The Parson court next turned its attention to subdivision 2 itself. It
interpreted the 1983 deletion of part 2 of section 176.101, subdivision 2, in light of the amended qualifications concerning TTD compensation, to mean that "[a]ll provision for the payment to an
unemployed partially disabled employee of compensation at the full
compensation rate for temporary total disability has been eliminated
from the statute." 43 It concluded by claiming that to reinstate the
old system of payment of TPD at the temporary total rate would frustrate the legislative goal underlying the 1983 overhaul, and would
render subdivision 3e(a) meaningless. 44
Although not specifically at issue, the court further examined section 176.101 to'hold that the statute, as amended, provided for TPD
compensation only in the situation where a temporary partially disabled employee is actually working.45 The court cited two reasons
38. Id.
39. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 1 (1988).
140. 428 N.W.2d at 75.
41. Subdivision 3d provides that "an employee who has incurred a personal injury shall receive temporary total compensation until these benefits are no longer
payable pursuant to this section...." MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3d (1988). Subdivision 3e(a) provides that temporary total compensation shall cease 90 days after
the employee has completed an approved retraining program or has reached MMI,
whichever occurs later. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3e(a) (1988).
42. Parson, 428 N.W.2d at 75.
43. Id.
44. 428 N.W.2d at 76.
45. Id. Section 176.101, subd. 3h provides that "[a]n employee who accepts a
job under subdivision 3e or subdivision 3f and begins that job shall receive temporary partial compensation pursuant to subdivision 2, if appropriate." MINN. STAT.
§ 176.101, subd. 3h (1988).
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for its conclusion. 4 6 First, the deletion of the provision for TPD at
the TD rate means that TPD compensation is now to be calculated
on the basis of pre- and post-injury wages. 4 7 Second, the court explained that the "disassociation" of the words "temporary compensation" from "disability" in subdivisions 3a to 3u of section 176.101
must mean that the legislature intended this new language to mean
something different than the old.48 According to the Parson court,
these changes compel "the conclusion that the legislature did not
intend that temporary partial compensation be available to empoyees who are not working."49 The court recognized the danger that
the new law had the potential to encourage employers not to rehire
temporarily partially disabled employees. Nevertheless, the court
declared that the legislature, not the court, is responsible for balancing interests and making adjustments to the system. 50
Finally, the court addressed Parson's argument that the limitation
of -IYD compensation to ninety days after maximum medical improvement violates both the United States and the Minnesota Constitutions by providing an inadequate substitute remedy for the right
to bring a civil action against the employer.51 The court summarily
dealt with Parson's argument by stating that he was paid TTD compensation before the cutoff period and was paid economic recovery
compensation thereafter.52 In addition, the court noted that Parson
could "also seek compensation payable for permanent total disability
3
if appropriate."5
Justice Wahl, dissenting in part, took exception with the majority's
conclusion that the 1983 deletion of language from section 176.101,
subdivision 2, evinces a clear intent to eliminate the payment of TPD
compensation to unemployed claimants.54 She pointed out that in
46. The Parson court also stated that the language of section 176.101, subdivision
3h implicitly "reaffirms the limitation on entitlement to temporary partial compensation." Id. However, the court failed to take the next step to indicate what the scope
of this limitation will be. Id.
47. Parson, 428 N.W.2d at 75. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 2 (1988).
48. 428 N.W.2d at 76. Compare Einberger v. 3M Co., No. 477-50-5883, slip op. at
8, n.8 (Minn. Worker's Comp. Ct. App. Feb. 1988). There the court noted that "New
Law" cases issued to date have used four different terms to describe benefits awarded
to an employee who has returned to work at wages lower than those earned at the
time of injury: "temporary partial disability benefits," "temporary partial benefits,"
"temporary partial disability compensation," and "temporary partial compensation."
Id.
49. Parson, 428 N.W.2d at 76.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 77.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 78. Neither justice Wahl nor Justice Popovich addressed the issue of
whether temporarily disabled unemployed workers should be entitled to TPD at the
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the recent decision of Gasper v. Northern Star Co., 5 5 the court had concluded that "the legislature's intent with respect to temporary partial
benefits [was] far from obvious."56 She further noted that nothing in
subdivision 2 specifically limits temporary partial disability benefits
to working employees. 5 7 Justice Wahl asserted that a "fair reading"
of the deleted language leads to the conclusion that the legislature
intended that "[i]nstead of calculating benefits at the temporary total
rate subject to a diligent work search, such benefits are to be calculated on the basis of earning capacity."58 Justice Wahl concluded by
stating that rather than frustrating the legislative intent underlying
the 1983 amendments, providing TPD benefits to unemployed temporarily partially disabled employees "promotes the goal of the 1983
amendments to quickly reintegrate injured workers back into the
workforce" by forcing the employer to provide employment or pay
higher benefits.50 Justice Popovich, dissenting, joined the dissent of
Justice Wahl, and also wrote a separate opinion. He declared that a
review of the legislative history surrounding the 1983 amendments
involving TPD benefits had proved unenlightening. 6 0 He noted that
even the majority recognized that the intent of the legislature concerning TPD benefits was not clear. 6 1 Justice Popovich would therefore have affirmed the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals
holding that TPD was payable in this case because there was no clear
legislative intent to eliminate TPD benefits to unemployed temporarily partially disabled employees. 6 2 Finally, he noted that the majority's interpretation paved the way for employer abuse, and called
upon the legislature to rectify the situation.63
B.
1.

Analysis

TTD Compensation Ninety Days After MMI or End of Rehabilitation.

In view of the intent of the legislature to curtail the open-ended
system of TTD compensation, and the 1983 amendments limiting
them to a specific duration, there is ample support to conclude that
the amended worker's compensation system does not provide for
TTD rate at and beyond 90 days post-MMI or an approved retraining program. Id. at
78-79 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part; Popovich, J., dissenting).
55. 422 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn. 1988).
56. Parson, 428 N.W.2d at 78.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 79.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 4 [1989], Art. 8
1078

WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 15

TTD compensation, ninety days after MMI or the end of an approved rehabilitation program.
TTD compensation is one of a triad of benefit categories available
to compensate the employee for lost earning capacity resulting from
a work-related injury.64 The statutory requisites for employee eligibility include several specified categories of injury,65 and "any other
injury which totally incapacitates the employee from working at an
occupation which brings the employee an income ....
66 In Schulte
v. C.H. Peterson Construction Co.,67 the court provided an additional
68
functional test based on its interpretation of the statute.
Before 1983, section 176.101, subdivision 1, entitled an employee
whose injury caused TTD to two-thirds of his daily wage at the time
of injury, subject to a maximum payment of the statewide average
weekly wage (SAWW) and a minimum payment of fifty percent of the
SAWW or the injured employee's actual weekly wage, whichever was
less. 6 9 TTD compensation was payable during the period of disability, with payments to be made at intervals approximating when the
wage was payable.70 Since TTD could continue for an indefinite duration, so could payments under this section. 7 1
One of the main criticisms of the former compensation scheme
64. MINN. STAT. § 176.021, subd. 3 (1988). The triad of benefits designed to
compensate an employee for lost earning capacity include TTD, TPD, and permanent total disability (hereafter PTD) benefits. Id. Permanent partial disability (hereafter PPD) benefits, on the other hand, are designed to compensate an employee for
"functional loss or impairment of function" associated with the work-related injury.
Id. See Tracy v. Streater/Litton Indus., 283 N.W.2d 909, 913-16 (Minn. 1979)(discussing the purpose of the various categories and upholding the constitutionality of
concurrent payment of loss of earning capacity and loss of function benefits under
section 176.021, subdivision 3).
65. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 5 (1988) (total and permanent loss of the sight
of both eyes, loss of both arms at the shoulder, loss of both legs so close to the hips
that no effective artificial members can be used, complete and permanent paralysis,
and total and permanent loss of mental faculties).
66. Id.
67. 278 Minn. 79, 153 N.W.2d 130 (1967).
68. Id. at 83, 153 N.W.2d at 133-34. The court stated that "a person is totally
disabled if his physical condition, in combination with his age, training, and experience, and the type of work available in his community, causes him to be unable to
secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial income." Id. at 83, 153 N.W.2d at 133. It further indicated that total disability is temporary "when it is likely it will exist for a limited period of time only." Id. at 83, 153
N.W.2d at 134.
69. 1977 Minn. Laws ch. 342, sec. 12 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 176.101, subd. 1 (1982)). The TTD provision further provided that "[i]n no case
shall a weekly benefit be less than 20 percent of the [SAWW]." Id.
70. Id.
71. Prior to .1974, both TTD and TPD compensation were limited to 350 weeks.
See MINN. STAT. § 176.101 (1967)(350 week limitation repealed by Act of June 4,
1975, ch. 359, sec. 8, 1975 Minn. Laws 1168, 1174).
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was the cost attributed to this open-ended system of TTD compensation.72 These costs included expense to employers in both ongoing

payouts and rising insurance costs, litigation expense for both employers and employees, 73 the adversary approach to employment
problems, and the physical74 and mental costs 75 to disabled employees wrought by how the system was manipulated by both employers 76

and

employees. 77

The

two-tier

system

of disability

compensation was designed, in part, to address this problem.78
The 1983 amendments to section 176.10 1, subdivision 1 made this
general provision governing TTD compensation "subject to" the

3a-u, which furspecific provisions of section 176.101, subdivisions
79
ther limit the availability of TTD compensation.

Section 176.101, subdivision 3e(a), contains the core rule limiting
TTD compensation to a specific duration. It mandates that TTD
compensation cease ninety days after an employee has reached MMI
and has been served a medical report to that effect, or 90 days after
an approved training program, whichever occurs later. 8O It further
reads that lTD compensation shall be curtailed earlier if otherwise
provided in the Act. 8 ' The language of subdivision 3e(a) makes it
72. See C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR., R. AZEVEDO, M. GONANNO, & P. SCHUMANN,
MINNESOTA WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS AND COSTS: AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS

86-87 (1983) (criticizing open-ended availability of TTD benefits, recommending termination of TTD benefits at maximum medical improvement, and proposing a 350
week limitation of payment). See generally Crochiere, supra note 6.
73. See Keefe, Benanav, Volz, Simoneau & Altman, The 1983-84 Amendments to the
Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act, 8 LABOR AND INDUSTRY COMPACT 23, 27 (October
1985).
74. See id. at 26-27.
75. See id.
76. See Crochiere, supra note 6, at 635-36 (discussing attempts by employers to
reduce TFD indemnity costs by, for example, offering an employee ajob which on its
face fit the injured employee's physical limitations and then discontinuing benefits
when the employee was unable to perform).
77. See id. at 637-38. On the other hand, employees would seek to have TFD
compensation continued by avoiding the employer, continuing to complain of physical problems, and failing to make good-faith efforts to find employment. Id.
78.

See Bananev, Two Tier in Minnesota, 9 LABOR & INDUSTRY COMPACT 20 (De-

cember 1985).
79.

MINN STAT. § 176.101, subd. 1 (1988).

80. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3e(1) (1988).
81. Id. TTD compensation shall cease earlier if the employee retires, is furnished
a job consistent with an approved plan of rehabilitation, or accepts or procures a
suitable job (one that the employee can do in his or her physical condition that "produces an economic status as close as possible to that the employee would have enjoyed without the disability") with another employer. Id. at subd. 3e(b). In addition,
the TD compensation will cease earlier if the temporarily totally disabled employee
is offered a light duty job by the employer, or accepts or procures a light duty job
with another employer. Id. at subd. 3f. Finally, if the employee refuses to accept the
suitable job offer, FED compensation will end at that point as well. Id. at subd. 3i.
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clear that T'D compensation is no longer open-ended.
2.

TPD Compensation at the TTD Rate

Is it likewise clear that after 1983 TPD compensation at the TTD
rate is no longer available to temporarily partially disabled workers
who have reached ninety days post-MMI or an approved rehabilitation program but have not been offered ajob by their employers and
have not been able to find a job despite diligent efforts? The logical
conclusion is yes. The deletion of this language from section
176.101, subdivision 2, provides strongest support for this answer.
Additional support can be found under the canons of construction
used by Minnesota courts to interpret statutory law. One of these
canons is that it is to be assumed that the legislature did not intend
the absurd. 8 2 It would be absurd indeed if temporarily partially disabled employees, employed or otherwise, could indefinitely receive
compensation at the TTD rate while temporarily totally disabled employees, under any circumstances, could not receive TTD compensation beyond MMI plus ninety days or ninety days after an approved
retraining program. Despite the lack of legislative history for guidance, the most likely explanation for the deletion of TPD compensation at the TTD rate for unemployed partially disabled employees
is that the legislature sought to return the payment of TTD compensation to the category's designed beneficiaries: those temporarily
without earning capacity.
It is not clear, however, why the revamped workers' compensation
system does not provide TPD compensation to temporarily partially
disabled workers who have not been able to find post-injury employment despite diligent efforts to do so.
3.

TPD Compensation and the Unemployed Worker

The Parson court's conclusion that the legislature intended that unemployed temporarily partially disabled workers should not receive
TPD compensation flies in the face of the legislative intent underlying the revamped workers' compensation system, the rationale underlying the original act, and the plain meaning of section 176.101,
subdivision 2.
In the court's own words, one of the goals of the legislature in
enacting the new statutory scheme was "to provide economic incentive for employers to provide suitable employment for injured employees." 8 3 As Justice Wahl recognized, rather than frustrate the
intent of the amendments,
the allowance of temporary partial benefits to all temporarily par82. MINN. STAT. § 645.17, subd. 1 (1988).
83. Parson v. Holman Erection Co., 428 N.W.2d 72, 76 (1988).
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tially disabled workers promotes the goal of the 1983 amendments
to quickly reintegrate injured workers back into the workforce by
economically forcing the employer to get the employee back into
the workforce (either with the
employer or elsewhere) or else pay
84
significantly greater benefits.
The Parson court's interpretation abrogates the time-honored purposes of the Act to shift the burden of payment for employee injuries
to the cost of production, and to prevent employees disabled from
work-related injuries from becoming public charges.85 After Parson,
the cost of injuries creating TPD has been shifted back to the employee who has been unable to find employment,86 and, in the case
where the employee has no personal resources, the cost has been
s7
shifted to society.
In view of the legislative goals of the 1983 amendments, and those
of the Act as a whole, it makes more sense to interpret the untouched
portion of section 176.101, subdivision 2, as providing TPD compensation to temporarily disabled workers who have diligently
sought work, but have had no success. A plain reading of subdivision 2 supports this interpretation.
Minnesota Statutes section 176.101, subdivision 2, the general
provision governing TPD compensation, reads:
In all cases of temporary partial disability the compensation shall
be 66-2/3 percent of the difference between the weekly wage of the
employee at the time of injury and the wage the employee is able to
earn in the employee's partially disabled condition. This compensation shall be paid during the period of disability except as provided in
this section .... 88
There is nothing in the general provision that specifically limits TPD
compensation to those partially disabled workers who are employed.89 Subdivision 2 does, however, allude to the possibility that
other limitations on TPD compensation may exist within the Act.
For purposes of this analysis, the general provision will be examined
first.
A plain reading of the first part of subdivision 2 goes beyond establishing that it does not negate such benefits. It mandates that in
all cases of TPD the employee shall be entitled to a certain percentage difference between what the employee earned, and what the employee is able to earn in the partially disabled condition. The statutory
language begs the question: what did the legislature mean by the
ability to earn? This language has been included in the TPD com84. Id. at 78 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part).
85. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.

87. See id.
88. MINN. STAT.

§

176.101, subd. 2.

89. Id. at subds. 1-8.
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pensation provision since 1913.90 Its meaning is the key to the resolution of whether a partially disabled employee must be employed
and receiving actual wages before entitled to compensation.
"Ability to earn" has not been defined in the Act. However, case
law interpreting section 176.101, subdivision 2, has made it clear
that it does not equate with actual wages. 9 ' In the 1937 decision of
Enrico v. Oliver Mining Co. ,92 the court held that what the employee
actually earns post-injury is not the same as earning ability.93 The
court explained that "the actual amount that an employee earns after
an accident isn't necessarily a fair measure of his earning capacity. It
is his ability to earn, not his actual earnings, that should be the basis
of the award."94 Though Enrico involved an award of compensation
for permanent partial disability (PPD), the court in Dorn v. A.J
Chromy Construction Co.95 adopted the Enrico holding in interpreting
the meaning of "able to earn" under section 176.101, subdivision
2.96 It added, however, that "actual, concrete evidence of earnings
...creates a presumption of earning capacity."97
The calculation of benefits under that portion of subdivision 2 left
after the 1983 amendments has throughout the history of the Act
been based on earning capacity, rather than post-injury wages. 9 8
More than fifty years of precedent should not be ignored. No previ90. See 1913 Minn. Laws ch. 467, sec. 13(b).
91. See, e.g., Dorn v. AJ. Chromy Constr. Co., 310 Minn. 42,46, 245 N.W.2d 451,

453 (1976). As recently as February 16, 1989, the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals handed down a decision making it clear that actual wages are
not conclusive as to earning capacity. Einberger v. 3M Co., No. 477-50-5883, slip.
op. (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Feb. 1989). In Einberger, the wage used to determine the earning capacity of the employee in that case was the $6.00 per hour
wage of the job the employee refused to accept rather than the $3.35 per hour wage
paid by the job taken. Id. at 8. This holding represents a return to earlier case law.

92. 199 Minn. 190, 271 N.W. 456 (1937).
93. Id. at 192, 271 N.W. at 457.
94. Id.
95. 310 Minn. 42, 245 N.W.2d 451 (1976).
96. Id. at 46, 245 N.W.2d at 45.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Ownes v. Pako Corp., 386 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Minn. 1986)(actual

earnings may differ from earning capacity, but concrete evidence of earnings creates
a presumption of earning capacity); Morehouse v. George A. Hormel & Co., 313
N.W.2d 8, 10 (Minn. 1981)(actual earnings considered evidence of earning capacity);
Dorn, 310 Minn. at 46, 245 N.W.2d at 453 (ability to earn, not actual earnings, should
be basis of award); Roberts v. Motor Cargo, Inc., 258 Minn. 425, 430-31, 104
N.W.2d 546, 550 (1960)(not what the employee earns after the injury but what employee is able to earn is determinative; however, actual earnings creates presumption
of earning capacity); Gildea v. State Dept. of Highways, 208 Minn. 185, 186, 293
N.W. 598, 599 (1940)(test is not the amount actually received in wages, rather it is
the ability to earn); Enrico., 199 Minn. at 191, 271 N.W. at 457 (ability to earn, not
actual -earnings, should be basis of the award); Koppe v. Hilton & Thompson, 176
Minn. 508, 223 N.W. 787 (1929)(claimant whose efficiency is reduced by the injury is
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ous cases interpreting this section have ever required that a person
must be employed before or during the receipt of TPD
compensation.
Courts in other jurisdictions initially struggling with the definition
of earning ability have held that an unemployed partially disabled
worker is entitled to partial compensation if the lack of success in
obtaining employment is causally related to the disability.99 These
courts reason that if the inability to find employment stems from an
employer's refusal to hire the injured employee because of the employee's reduced physical capacity, then the employee should receive
compensation because his or her partial disability was the proximate
cause of the inability to obtain employment.100 On the other hand, if
the inability to obtain employment was caused by a general business
depression or the employee's own fault, i.e., unrelated to the employee's reduced physical capacity, then the employee may not be
entitled to partial disability compensation. 10 1
Contrary to the Parson court's determination, the deletion of the
provision for TPD compensation at the TTD rate from section
176.101, subdivision 2 does not automatically mean that TPD compensation is now to be calculated based on the difference between
pre and post-injury wages. The legislative intent underlying that
portion of subdivision 2 remaining after the 1983 amendments was
to secure to the employee a portion of the wages the employee lost
through incapacity caused by injury or occupational disease.1o 2 If
the failure of other employers to hire the partially disabled employee
is based on the employee's reduced physical capacity, this is no less a
direct result of the initial injury and should be compensable. The
entitled to TPD compensation although employer as a gratuity continues her full
wages-she is not "able to earn" full wages).
99. See Gorrell v. Battelle, 93 Kan. 370, 144 P. 244 (1914); Milton's Case, 122
Me. 437, 120 A. 533 (1923); Ray's Case, 122 Me. 108, 119 A. 191 (1922)(speaking to
"incapacity to earn" and "incapacity for work," and holding that "incapacity for
work" includes, "not merely want of physical ability to work, but lack of opportunity
to work"). See generally Recent Case Decisions, 13 MINN. L. REV. 620 (1929); Annotation, Workmen 's Compensation: Statutory Phrase "Incapacity For Work" Or The Like, As Including Inability To Obtain Work Following An Injury, 33 A.L.R. 115 (1922).
For more recent case examples from other jurisdictions speaking to the requirement of a causal connection between disability and loss of earning capacity for entitlement to compensation, see Fletcher v. Industrial Commission, 120 Ariz. 571, 587
P.2d 757, 759 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Theriault v. Walsh Const. Co., 389 A.2d 317
(Me. 1978).
100. See, e.g., Milton's Case, 122 Me. 437, 442, 120 A. 533, 535 (1923).
101. See id., 120 A. at 535.
102. MINN. STAT. § 176.021, subd. 3 (1988). This subdivision states that
"[l]iability on the part of an employer or the insurer for disability of a temporary
total, temporary partial, and permanent total nature shall be considered as a continuing product and part of the employee's inability to earn or reduction in earning capacity due to injury or occupational disease .
" I.
Id.
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same result should obtain if the employee is not able to find employment tailored to the employee's reduced physical capacity where employment for those without disability is available. In this case, the
inability to work is also directly related to the injury. This causal
relationship between injury and reduced earning ability has been
recognized by case decisions in Minnesota.103
If TPD compensation is to compensate the worker for reduced
ability to earn, there are only three cases where a temporarily partially disabled unemployed worker should not receive TPD compensation. First, as the current Act already provides, the employee
should not be entitled to TPD compensation where the employee
has failed to accept suitable employment.104 Second, the employee
should not receive TPD compensation if the employee refuses to diligently search for employment he or she is physically able to do.
Third, the partially disabled employee should not receive TPD compensation if the employee's inability to obtain employment is due to
general business depression and the employee, even if whole, still
would not have been able to find employment. That is, the employee
would not have been able to keep his or her former position, or find
any other position in the given community, had the employee remained whole.
The rationale for the first two exceptions is that the partially disabled employee should not be rewarded for failure to mitigate his or
her damaged earning capacity.105 The second basis for the first two
exceptions, and the primary basis for the third, is that the reduced
earning capacity would not be due to the initial injury: the partially
disabled employee would be receiving compensation for something
other than decreased earning ability related to the initial injury.
Notwithstanding the meaning of "ability to earn," the fact remains
that had the legislature intended a general requirement that temporarily partially disabled claimants be employed and that compensation be based on the difference between pre- and post-injury wages,
section 176.101, subdivision 2 would have simply been amended to
read "the compensation shall be 66-2/3 percent of the difference between the weekly wage of the employee at the time of injury and those
wages earned in the employee's partially disabled condition."10 6
103. See, e.g., Arouni v. Kelleher Constr., Inc., 426 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Minn. 1988);
Violette v. Midwest Printing Co., 415 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1987); Morehouse v.
George A. Hormel & Co., 313 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Minn. 1981); Kuehn v. State, 271
N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. 1978); Dorn v. A.J. Chromy Constr. Co., 310 Minn. 42,
46-47, 245 N.W.2d 451, 454 (1976).
104. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3n (1988)
105. See Bower v. Whitehall Leather Co., 412 Mich. 172, 182, 312 N.W.2d 640,
644 (1981)(discussing common law doctrine of mitigation in reference to an employee's action in refusing favored work).
106. Professor Larson noted:
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As noted previously, however, subdivision 2 may be read as pointing to other provisions contained in the Act that may limit the availability of TPD compensation. The Parson court pointed to section
176.101, subdivision 3h, concerning the acceptance of a suitable or
light duty job prior to ninety days post-MMI or completion of an
approved retraining program, as "reaffirm[ing] the limitation on entitlement to [TPD] compensation implicit in the 1983 amendment to
subdivision 2."107 The language of this subdivision, however, could
be read to mean a great many things, including, but not limited to:
(1) an employee who accepts a suitable or light duty job that pays
less than the employee's pre-injury employment may receive TPD
compensation; or (2) an employee who accepts a suitable or light
duty job which pays as much as the pre-injuryjob should not receive
TPD compensation as no reduction in earning capacity has occurred.
Since the language of this subdivision is not clear, it should not be
relied upon to cancel TPD compensation to unemployed workers
who have diligently searched for employment.108 Indeed there is another provision in the Act which argues for the opposite result.
Subdivision 3k of section 176.101109 mandates that an employee
who begins a suitable job but is subsequently laid off due to its seasonal nature shall receive both unemployment compensation and the
amount of TPD compensation the employee was receiving at the
time of the lay off.I 10 This subdivision specifically "reaffirms" the entitlement of TPD compensation to temporarily partially disabled
workers who have become unemployed.
The Parson court's argument that the disassociation of the words
"temporary compensation" from "disability" in subdivisions 3a-u of
subdivision 176.101 must mean that TPD compensation is not available to unemployed workers is without merit. II The fact that the
amended Act refers to temporary total compensation rather than
[U]nder those statutes which compare . . . "average monthly wages before
the accident" with "the monthly wages he is able to earn thereafter," the
test remains one of capacity. If the legislature had spoken of the wages "he
has been able to earn thereafter," the comparison of actual wage with actual
wage would be indicated.
2A LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 57.20 (1982).
107. Parson v. Holman Erection Co., 428 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Minn. 1988). Subdivision 3h provides that "[a]n employee who accepts ajob under subdivision 3e or subdivision 3f and begins that job shall receive temporary partial compensation pursuant
to subdivision 2, if appropriate." MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3h (1988) (emphasis
added).
108. Those partially disabled employees who have refused a suitable job offer and
subsequently return to work at a lesser paying job will not receive TPD compensation. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3n (1988). The theory is that since they have
turned down a suitable offer, they have not "diligently searched for employment."
109. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3k (1988).
110. Id.
111. Parson, 428 N.W.2d at 75-76.
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temporary total disability compensation means little in itself. The
fact that the words "temporary partial" and the word "compensation" are written together only under section 176.101, subdivision
3h, referring to the acceptance of a suitable or lesser paying job,
does not mean that to receive TPD an employee must be working.
After all, subdivision 2, the main provision governing the availability
of TPD, states, "In all cases of temporary partial disability the compensation shall be 66-2/3 percent of the difference between the
weekly wage of the employee at the time of injury and the wage the
employee is able to earn in the employee's partially disabled condition."112 The fact that the words "temporary partial disability" and
"compensation" are not written together under this provision does
not mean TPD compensation is not available.
There are no general or specific provisions contained in the Act
that limit TPD compensation to employed temporarily partially disabled workers.
4.

ConstitutionalConsiderations

Respondent Parson argued, unsuccessfully, that his due process
rights under the fifth'13 and fourteenth amendmentsl14 of the
United States Constitution, and his right to a "certain remedy"' 15
under article 1, section 8, of the Minnesota Constitution, were violated by the Act's limitation on the availability of TTD compensation
to ninety days post MMI.1 16 The basis for his position was that the
limitation on TTD compensation provides an inadequate substitute
remedy for the worker's right to bring a civil action against the employer. 117 His lack of success was foreseeable.118 The barriers a
112. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 2 (1988).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall be ...deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law .. "
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... "
115. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8. Section 8 provides that "[elvery person is entitled
to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive to his
person, property or character, and to obtain justice freely and without purchase,
completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the
laws." Id. (emphasis added).
116. Parson v. Holman Erection Co., 428 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Minn. 1988).
117. Id. "Specifically, employee asserts that the 'new law' limitation of temporary
total compensation provides an inadequate substitute remedy for an injured worker
in light of the fact that the worker under the Act has given up his right to bring a civil
action against the employer." Id. See also Respondent's Brief at 12-13, Parson v.
Holman Erection Co., 428 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 1988), where it was stated that
[i]f the Workers' Compensation act is interpreted to preclude the payment
of total disability to an employee who is in fact totally disabled as a result of
a work related injury in Minnesota, then the employee challenges the consti-
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proponent of such an argument must overcome, especially in the
context of the Workers' Compensation Act, are formidable to say the
least.
A statute is presumed constitutional "unless its challengers clearly
show that it is otherwise.", 19 In the context of reviewing a due process challenge to the constitutional validity of the Act, the court has
declared that "a common-law right of action may be abrogated without providing a reasonable substitute if a permissible legislative objective is pursued."120 "[N]either a one-for-one balance nor a
reasonable substitute for abrogated common-law rights is required
for validity."121
In light of the above rules, it is possible that TTD compensation
could have been eliminated altogether if there was a permissible legislative objective. The amended Act did not eliminate TID compensation. Rather, the amended Act limited the availability of TTD
compensation, thus pursuing the legislative objective of curtailing
the open-ended availability of disability compensation and the resultant cost to both employees and employers.122 This objective satisfies the ultimate test of constitutionality in the area of due process,
i.e., "whether the statute is so arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust as
to be repugnant to the due process guarantees."12 3
A constitutional challenge based on the lack of a "certain remedy,"
within the meaning of article 1, section 8 of the Minnesota Constitution also fails in this situation. In response to this type of situation,
the court has indicated that "[a] wide discretion is vested in the legislature in determining when a public welfare need exists and in the
selection of an appropriate remedy."124 The Act must be examined
tutionality of that statute on the grounds that it arbitrarily, capriciously and
impermissibly invades the employee's statutory remedy provided as a substitute for his common law right to sue for negligence. As such it denies the
employee's due process of law.

Id.
118. Parson, 428 N.W.2d at 77. Actually, Parson's Brief is unclear as to whether he
was arguing that the limitation of TTD compensation violated provisions of the Minnesota Constitution, or the Minnesota Constitution and the United States Constitution. See Brief for Respondent at 13-14, Parson v. Holman Erection Co., Inc., 428
N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 1988).
119. Tracy v. Streater/Litton Indus., 283 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Minn. 1979)(citations
omitted). Tracy, oddly enough, involved a challenge by an employer who felt his due
process rights were being violated due to the fact that he was required to pay for both
functional loss and loss of earning capacity. Id. at 913.
120. Id. at 915 (quoting Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375,
385, 201 N.W.2d 140, 146 (1972)).
121. Id. at 914.
122. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
123. Tracy, 283 N.W.2d at 916.
124. Breimhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 430, 35 N.W.2d 719, 733 (1949)(citations omitted).
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in its entirety to determine whether an adequate remedy has been
provided. 125
Although there are constitutional limits beyond which a legislature
may not go in restricting an injured worker's remedy,126 those limits
have not been violated by the amended Act. TTD benefits have not
been eliminated. In addition, the Act still provides that the injured
employee may receive other forms of compensation, i.e., for permanent total disability127 or permanent partial disability in the form of
economic recovery1 28 or impairment compensation.1 29 Furthermore, in the event that the employee suffers "a personal injury for
which [TTD compensation] is payable but which produces no permanent partial disability and the employee is unable to return to former
employment for medical reasons attributable to the injury, the employee [is entitled to] receive 26 weeks of compensation."130 Viewed
in its entirety, the Act does not violate the prohibition against failure
to provide a "certain remedy" within the meaning of Minnesota
Constitution article 1, section 8 simply by limiting the availability of
TTD compensation to ninety days post-MMI.
After Parson, however, a temporarily partially disabled employee
who has, despite diligent efforts, been unable to secure employment
may have an argument that his or her inability to receive TPD compensation violates the equal protection clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment1s of the United States Constitution.
At first blush, it appears that the state has a rational basis for discriminating between employed and unemployed temporarily disabled employees in providing compensation. The argument is based
on administrative convenience: whereas actual post-injury earnings
present a convenient yardstick for determining an employee's postinjury earning ability, it would require more time and expense to
make the same determination for an unemployed employee. This
argument would make some sense except for the fact that a factual
inquiry into true earning ability is still made even if the temporary
partially disabled employee has found work and is receiving actual
125. Id. at 434-35, 35 N.W.2d at 735.
126. Referring to the Act, the Breimhorst court stated that "the remedy adopted
thereunder must be reasonably designed to accomplish its purpose without going
beyond the reasonable demands of the occasion." Id. at 430, 35 N.W.2d at 732-33.
127. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 4 (1988).
128. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3a (1988).
129. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3b (1988).
130. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3t(b) (1988).
131. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides that
"[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
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wages. 132
There is no rational basis to distinguish between temporarily partially disabled workers who have been fortunate enough to find employment suited to their reduced physical capabilities, and those
whose inability to find employment is causally related to their reduced physical capabilities, in determining who is entitled to compensation. Both have had a reduction in their "ability to earn"
within the meaning of section 176.101, subdivision 2.
5. Encroachment Upon the Legislative Branch and the Determination that
TPD Compensation is Limited To Employed Temporarily
Disabled Workers

With due respect to the court, TPD compensation under the current statutory scheme is problematic in that the availability of these
benefits is not limited where the temporarily partially disabled employee continues working at a job that pays less than the pre-injury
employment.133 However, the legislature is the proper body to supply any limitation to TPD compensation. Absent a clear indication
that the intent of the legislature was to limit TPD compensation to
employed workers, the court has no basis for engaging in judicial
legislation to create this requirement.134
Just three months earlier, in the case of Gasper v. Northern States
Power Co.,135 the court refused to read a similar limitation into section 176.101, subdivision 3h.136 That section relates to the acceptance of a light duty or suitable job prior to MMI plus ninety days or
ninety days after an approved rehabilitation program. 3 7 In Gasper,
the court refused to read to statute to mean that only an employee
who begins a light duty or suitable job within the time specified
under that subdivision may receive TPD compensation.138 The
court stated that had the legislature meant "only" it would have written "only" into the statute.' 3 9 It added, "In the absence of express
language, we decline to read such a limitation into the statute."' 40
132. See Einberger v. 3M Co., No. 477-50-5883, slip. op. at 8-11 (Minn. Workers'
Comp. Ct. App. Feb. 1989).
133. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3h (1988).
134. See Gasper v. Northern Star Co., 422 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn. 1988).
135. Id.
136. Id. The court held that "[a]n injured employee, working at a wage loss, is
entitled to the temporary partial disability benefits 90 days after maximum medical
improvement where the employee has not been offered and has not found a 'suitable'
job under Minn. Stat. § 176.101, subd. 3e or 3f (1984) within that 90-day period."

Id.
137. MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3h (1988).
138. Gasper, 422 N.W.2d at 730.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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Again, had the legislature meant that "only employed" temporarily partially disabled workers are entitled to receive TPD compensation, it would have written such a requirement into the statute.
6.

The Opportunityfor Employer Abuse

The opportunity for employer abuse which the court saw in the
provisions governing TPD compensation was a danger of the court's
own making. The danger is real: once an employee becomes partially disabled through a work-related injury there is no impetus for
the employer to find work which the employee can do. Injured employees can suffer reinjury or aggravation of injury while on the job.
Since, after Parson, the employer will have no monetary penalty for
failing to rehire the injured employee, it is in the employer's interest
to do nothing to help the injured employee and hope this employee
cannot find a new job to fit his or her reduced physical abilities.
The gravity of this situation is best understood by way of a concrete example. In Kraus v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,141 Judge
Shimon, dissenting, poignantly exposed the plight of the unemployed temporary partially disabled worker.142 Referring to the case
before the court, she explained that "the cost of the marketplace visa-vis the employer and insurer is almost nil." The employer provided no job fitting the employee's reduced abilities; the employer
and its insurer refused the employee's request for retraining; and,
the compensation judge denied the retraining request due to the lack
of prospect of a high-paying job upon completion.143 As a result, the
employee, a single mother who formerly supported her four children
on $440/week, now has "no job, no chance of ajob and no chance or
earning a wage-any wage-low or high."' 144 Judge Shimon might
have added that, after Parson, this unemployed mother of four has no
chance of receiving any TPD compensation either.
III.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

Though the unfortunate dicta in the Parson decision is not binding,

it has already had the predictable result of supplying a basis for decisions holding that TPD compensation is not available to temporarily
partially disabled workers who, despite diligent effort, have not been
able to find work. In other words, the dicta has since become law.
Peplow v. ContinentalBaking 145 was the first workers' compensation
court of appeals case that adopted the Parson dicta as law. Peplow
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

No. 472-54-4496, Slip op. (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1988).
Id. at 4.
Id.

Id.
No. 350-24-5273, slip op. (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1988).
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involved an appeal by the Continental Baking Company from a determination that its employee, Richard Peplow, was entitled to,
among other things, TPD compensation as a result of a Gillette 146
type injury suffered during his employ with Continental. 147 Initially
when Peplow sought medical attention for his injured shoulder, he
informed Continental and was given light work. 148 Peplow's physician subsequently required that he restrict his lifting to ten pounds
and that he not participate in any repetitious overhead work. When
Peplow informed Continental of the restrictions imposed by his doctor, Continental indicated that no work was available for him.
Thereafter he was unsuccessful in finding employment suited to his
reduced physical abilities. 149 At the compensation hearing, both the
employer and the employee's rehabilitation expert agreed that
Peplow had a decreased earning capacity and reached similar dollar
amounts as to the wage Peplow should be able to bring in his condition.150 The compensation judge awarded TPD compensation based
on the difference between pre-injury wages and his finding of postinjury earning capacity. 151
Without discussing the issue, the court of appeals reversed the
compensation judge's award of TPD compensation under part one of
section 176.101, subdivision 2. The court declared that, under Parson, TPD compensation was not available to Peplow at all as he had
not worked since being told that no work was available for him.152
In subsequent decisions, the workers' compensation court of appeals has denied TPD compensation to unemployed partially disabled employees who based their arguments solely upon evidence of
a reduced earning capacity. 153 Finally, two recent supreme court de146. See Gillette v. Harold, Inc. 257 Minn. 313, 101 N.W.2d 200 (1960).
147. Peplow, No. 350-24-5273, slip op. (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Aug. 25,

1988).
148. Id. at 2.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 5.

151. Id.
152. Id. at 4. Judge Shimon, dissenting in part, argued in a separate opinion that
the majority of the Peplow court had erred in reversing Peplow's award of TPD compensation. She began by stating that the compensation judge had awarded only TPD
benefits, not TPD benefits at the TPD rate. Id. She further pointed out that the
determination by the Parson court that an employee who was disabled from a workrelated injury, but was unemployed despite a diligent search, was not entitled to TPD
benefits was dicta, and therefore not binding on the Peplow court. Id. at 6. She
pointed out that both the employer's Qualified Rehabilitation Consultant (QRC) and
the employee's QRC had testified as to Peplow's reduced earning capacity. Id. at 4-5.
Judge Shimon concluded that the evidence as to Peplow's reduced earning capacity,
coupled with his diligent job search, entitled Peplow to TPD compensation. Id. at

4-8.
153. Miller v. North Central Door Co., No. 501-34-4052, slip op. at 4 (Minn.
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cisions have sounded the death knell concerning the availability of
TPD benefits to partially disabled employees who, despite diligent
efforts, are unable to find jobs.154
In Morrissey v. Country Club Markets, Inc.,155 the supreme court, citing Parson, reversed an award of TPD compensation based on stipulated earning capacity for a one-month period where the employee
was between jobs after MMI plus ninety days.' 56 Similarly in Tews v.
George A. Hormel & Co. ,157 the supreme court reversed an award for
TPD compensation covering a period when the employee became
unemployed after having been employed in a post-injury, post-MMI
58
plus ninety days,job. 1

IV.

ALTERNATIVES

The legislature should be called upon to notify the court, through
appropriate legislation, that unemployed temporary partially disabled employees, whose reduced earning ability and unemployment
is causally related to injury or occupational disease, should receive
TPD compensation. A factual inquiry could be undertaken to determine whether the inability to find employment is caused by general
business depression, the employee's own fault, or an unwillingness
on the part of employers to hire the injured worker. Then compensation could be either awarded or not, depending on the particular
case. Post-injury earning capacity can be determined, as is already
done, by Qualified Rehabilitation Consultants. 15 9 The problem concerning unlimited TPD compensation can easily be resolved by limiting compensation availability to a specified number of weeks as was
Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1988); Kraus v. [IT Continental Baking Co., No.
472-54-4496, slip op. at 3, (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1988).
154. Tews v. George A. Hormel & Co., 430 N.W.2d 178 (Minn. 1988); Morrissey
v. Country Club Markets, Inc., 430 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1988).
155. 430 N.W.2d at 169.
156. Id. at 170.
157. 430 N.W.2d at 178.
158. Id. at 180. There may remain a final exception to the general rule that a
temporary partially disabled employee must be employed to be eligible to receive
TPD compensation. Although its continued validity is questionable in light of Tews,
the court in Kirchner v. County of Anoka, 339 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. 1983), held that
where an employee becomes totally disabled from one injury while receiving TPD
compensation for a previous injury, that part of the temporary disability attributable
to the first injury is to be paid in the form of TPD compensation. Id. at 913. That
part of the temporary disability attributable to the second injury, which resulted in
temporary total disability, is to be paid in the form of -fTDcompensation. Id. For
more details see Kirchner v. County of Anoka, 40 Minn. W.C.D. 186 (1986), aff'das
modified, 410 N.W.2d 825 (Minn. 1987).
159. See, e.g., Peplow, No. 350-24-5273, slip op. (Minn. Workers' Comp. Ct. App.
Aug. 25, 1988).
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originally done when the Act was created.160
CONCLUSION

The 1983 amendments to the Minnesota Workers' Compensation
Act have removed all provision for TPD at the TTD rate for unemployed partially disabled who have reached ninety days post-MMI or
an approved retraining program. However, the remaining statutory
provisions governing TPD compensation and pre-Parsoncase law interpreting those provisions do not support the Parson court's determination that TPD is not available to those partially disabled injured
employees who, despite diligent effort, have been unable to find employment. It is incumbent upon the legislature to make clear that
this was not intended.
Morgan A. Godfrey
160.

1913 Minn. Laws, ch. 467, sec. 13(a)(compensation restricted to a period of

three hundred weeks).
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